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LETTER FROM THE DIRECTOR

T

he Jack D. Gordon Institute for Public Policy, which is part of the Steven J. Green School
of International and Public Affairs (SIPA) at Florida International University (FIU), is
honored to publish the second issue of Global Security Review (GSR). GSR represents
our institute’s ongoing effort to bridge the divide between academia and the policy world and to
increase public understanding of the most critical national security challenges. The first issue
addressed a wide range of threats that impact national security, from the late Robert Jervis’
article on global terrorism to pieces on U.S. energy security, Plan Colombia, terrorism in the
Caribbean, and the growing cyber threats. This issue focuses on strategic competition in Latin
America and the Caribbean and the geo-political implications.
The global environment of the Twenty-First Century continues to become more politically,
culturally, and technologically complex with the increasing connectiveness of the world, growth
within the cyber domain, and the importance of the information environment in controlling
narratives. A rising China, a recalcitrant Russia, and a growing number of proxies challenge
western values and U.S. hegemony in the world, particularly in Latin America. Using a variety of
military and economic tools, as well as disinformation and soft power, China and Russia create
strategic ambiguity that reduces recognition of threats and appropriate responses by partner
nations. Lines between war and peace are blurred, leading to a new paradigm of strategic
competition.
The first article by Hal Brands and Ryan Berg provides an overview of strategic competition
in the Western Hemisphere, adding historical and political context to its evolution since the
Monroe Doctrine. It provides principles for an appropriate U.S. response. Margaret Myers
follows with an insightful look at China’s COVID-19 Diplomacy in the region, to include its
objectives and methods that are intended to reinforce regional ties and advance commercial and
policy interests. Vladimir Rouvinski pivots to another great-power rival, Russia, and its return
to the Western Hemisphere. He explains Russia’s view of its right to advance special interests in
neighboring, former Soviet states and how this drives Russian motivations within Latin America
and the Caribbean, as well as its efforts to control the narrative in the information environment.
Furthermore, many environmental, economic, political, security, and health factors have driven
significant migration throughout the world in recent years. Betilde Muñoz-Pogossian and Diego
Chaves-González explore the relationship between natural disasters, internal displacement,
and violence as drivers of Central American migration. As an increasing number of state and
non-state actors conduct a variety of cyber operations, Louise Marie Hurel looks beyond “great
powers” in her article examining how Latin America views cyber operations and norms. Finally,
Marcus Boyd and Samuel Henkin address the growing threat of transnational organized crime,
and their global scope, institutionalized violence, and impact on the global economy.
In conclusion, we hope that you enjoy our second issue of Global Security Review. GSR will be
published annually and include articles from leading scholars and practitioners that address
the most pressing national security issues. FIU and the Gordon Institute will continue hosting
conferences and workshops and publishing policy papers, reports, books, and articles on these
topics, and will include this content in FIU’s Security Research Hub. The Security Research Hub
is a centralized, open-source community that supports collaboration and shared understanding
on security topics by leveraging subject matter experts from across academia, civil society,
government, and private industry.

Brian Fonseca
DIRECTOR | JACK D. GORDON INSTITUTE FOR PUBLIC POLICY
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THE RETURN OF GEOPOLITICS: LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN IN AN
ERA OF GREAT-POWER RIVALRY1
Ryan C. Berg & Hal Brands
This article is taken from a larger report published
by Ryan C. Berg and Hal Brands titled “The Return of
Geopolitics: Latin America and the Caribbean in an
Era of Great-Power Rivalry”. The full publication can
be found at www.gordoninstitute.fiu.edu/research/
publications.

1

W

ith the advent of the Biden administration,
it has become clear that the idea of focusing
U.S. strategy on “great-power competition” enjoys
widespread bipartisan support. American statecraft is
increasingly directed at the threats posed by powerful
state rivals—especially China—as opposed to SalafiJihadist extremists and other non-state actors.2
Yet geopolitical rivalry is not simply something that
happens “over there,” in the Indo-Pacific, Europe, and
the Middle East. It also happens “over here”—within the
Western Hemisphere.
Just as geopolitical competition is more the norm than
the exception for the United States, historically America
has faced recurring threats from major-power rivals
operating in Latin America. This pattern is repeating itself
today, as the countries—China, Russia, and to a lesser
extent, Iran—with which the United States is competing in
overseas regions are, in turn, competing with the United
States in its shared neighborhood. These challenges have
not yet risen to the level of the Cold War-era threat posed
by the Soviet-Cuban alliance or even the Nazi presence
in many Latin American countries prior to World War
II. But they are gradually calling core American strategic
interests in Latin America into question.
For roughly 200 years, the core American interest
in the region has been strategic denial—preventing
powerful rivals from achieving strategic footholds in
Latin America or otherwise significantly impairing
U.S. influence and security in the region. The nature
and severity of the challenges to that objective have
varied over time, as have the urgency and methods of
the American response. As the United States enters
a new period of geopolitical rivalry, it must update its
understanding of strategic denial to fit the facts on the
ground.

The tradition of strategic denial
The essential thrust of U.S. policy in the Western Hemisphere has thus been strategic denial vis-à-vis other great
powers. American officials have sought to prevent major
rivals from developing regional footholds from which they
can menace, distract, or otherwise undercut the strategic
interests of the United States. There has also been a per-
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sistent, if not always consistent, ideological component
to strategic denial—a belief that non-democratic political
systems in Latin America and the Caribbean constitute a
conduit through which malign actors can exert their influence. “It is impossible that the allied powers should
extend their political system to any portion” of the Americas, stated James Monroe in his eponymous doctrine,
“without endangering our peace and happiness.”
Yet if the basic objective of strategic denial has endured
over time, the manifestations and targets of that policy
have repeatedly shifted. The Monroe Doctrine warned
against a restoration of formal European colonial
empires in Latin America; the “political system” it
sought to exclude from the hemisphere was monarchy.
Although John Quincy Adams prevailed on Monroe to
issue that statement as a unilateral declaration rather
than “come in as a cock-boat in the wake of the British
man-of-war,” it was London—which had its own policy
of strategic denial vis-à-vis its European rivals—whose
navy enforced the edict for most of the 19th century.
The United States, for its part, spent much of this period
trying to prevent, not always successfully, the expansion
of European influence in Latin America rather than
liquidating it where it remained.
This posture changed in response to growing American
power and shifting international threats. In 1898, the
United States defeated—for the first time since the
American Revolution—a European power in a major
military conflict and thereby banished Spain from the
hemisphere. During the 1890s and early 1900s, America
used various forms of coercive diplomacy to reduce
a distracted United Kingdom’s influence around the
Caribbean basin and gain exclusive control over the
routes for an isthmian canal. Meanwhile, concerns
that internal instability and financial insolvency might
invite European interposition elicited the Roosevelt
Corollary, which established a tradition of “protective
imperialism”—of Washington intervening in troubled
Caribbean countries so that hostile actors would not
have a pretext to do so. This theory of strategic denial
paved the way for multiple American interventions—
in the Dominican Republic, Haiti, Nicaragua, even
Mexico—in the subsequent decades.
That heavy-handedness provoked blowback, however,
and in the Franklin Delano Roosevelt era, strategic
denial took on yet another form—this time under the
moniker of a “good neighbor policy.” FDR would end
lingering U.S. occupations, hoping that a less invasive
presence focused more on economic ties and deemphasizing a military dimension of strategic denial—
combined with the steady hand of friendly dictators—
would better consolidate the hemisphere against the
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growing fascist threat. At the Havana Conference in
1940, the United States announced, in the guise of
a multilateral declaration, that it would enforce the
Monroe Doctrine against any extra-hemispheric power
that violated the territorial or political sovereignty
of a Western Hemisphere state. The fear persisted,
particularly after the fall of France, that Nazi Germany
would use subversion, economic coercion, or even direct
aggression to turn South American or Central American
countries into platforms to threaten the United States.3
In response, Washington used various methods, from
good intelligence work to blunt diplomatic pressure,
to limit German influence in the region and eventually
bring Latin American and Caribbean governments into
World War II on the side of the Grand Alliance.
During the Cold War, the target of strategic denial
was Moscow; the danger was that local communists
would take power, through peaceful or violent means,
and turn their countries into beachheads for Soviet
military and political influence. As Castro’s revolution
in Cuba showed, a Soviet presence in the Caribbean
would endanger American sea lines of communication
and expose major gaps in the country’s air defenses.
It would be a launching point and logistical, financial,
and training hub for other burning insurgencies in
the region. A United States consumed with fighting
communist regimes and revolutionaries close to
home would, in turn, find it far more difficult to
concentrate its energies on checking Soviet influence
in Europe, the Middle East, or Asia. It might even find
its physical security endangered. It was this prospect
that led Jeane Kirkpatrick to declare, in the 1980s,
that Central America was “the most important region
in the world.”4

U.S. Blind spots and the Latin America
paradox
The post-Cold War era also revived another, and less
salubrious, tradition in U.S. policy—the Latin America
paradox. That paradox resides in the fact that Latin
America is perhaps the most important region for the
United States, in the sense that pervasive insecurity or
danger there could pose a more direct threat to America
than equivalent disorder in any other region. The
Mexican Revolution, for example, elicited not one but
two U.S. military interventions for just this reason. But
Latin America has traditionally received considerably
less foreign policy attention than other regions
because American influence there—while periodically
challenged—has long been so preeminent.
Since the 1990s, this blind spot has been exacerbated
by several other factors. First, although there have been
major security challenges in the region, most have taken
the form of drug-related violence and out-of-control
criminality—domestic challenges often viewed as law
enforcement matters that lack an obvious geopolitical
salience. Compare, for instance, the remarkably scant
attention that ongoing state failure and rampant violence
in Mexico have received over the last fifteen years to the
attention those phenomena would have received had it
been caused by a Communist insurgency with links to
the Kremlin during the Cold War. “Law enforcement
problems” are, by their nature, unsexy in the foreign
policy world.

The United States used the full panoply of tools—
economic development programs, military coups,
covert action, and direct military intervention—to
fight the expansion of Soviet and Cuban influence.
In some cases, it sought to promote democracy and
economic reform as antidotes to revolution; in others,
it partnered with conservative or downright reactionary
Latin American regimes such as the Brazilian military
dictatorship to bludgeon leftist movements. But by the
1980s, Washington was more decisively moving toward
a strategy that employed democratization as a tool of
strategic denial, by establishing legitimate regimes
that would be less vulnerable to challenges by Marxist
insurgents.

Second, the largely democratic nature—or perhaps the
democratic patina—of the region has masked the severity
of underlying challenges. Since the early 1990s, the vast
majority of Latin American and Caribbean governments
have been democracies, in the sense that they have
regular, contested elections. After Mexico’s transition
in 2000, Cuba was the only fully authoritarian regime
in the hemisphere. Yet the existence of democratic
procedures, consolidated in regional diplomatic accords
such as the Inter-American Democratic Charter, has
obscured concerning levels of political backsliding in
countries from Central America to the Southern Cone,
in addition to the emergence of violently repressive
authoritarianism in Venezuela. It has also dulled the
U.S. response to the creeping accumulation of extrahemispheric influence in hemispheric affairs, in many
cases through the exact same countries experiencing a
rapid decline in the quality of democratic governance.

Within another few years, the Cold War had ended, and
the threat of alien ideologies and extra-hemispheric
power faded more fully than ever before. They did not,
however, disappear for good.

Finally, blind spots in Latin America have been
exacerbated by the intensity and number of challenges
the United States has confronted elsewhere. The 9/11
attacks led to a heightened focus on Colombia, because
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the guerrilla insurgency there could be viewed through
a counter-terrorism prism. But in most cases, the war
on terror diverted focus from the region. More recently,
American resources and attention have been consumed
by a remarkably full foreign policy agenda—ongoing
instability in the Middle East and Africa, including
a chaotic withdrawal from Afghanistan, a resurgent
and revisionist Russia, periodic North Korean nuclear
crises, the rise of China as a regional and increasingly
global power, along with the pressing problems posed
by climate change, pandemics, and other transnational
challenges. Even as the situation has deteriorated in
Latin America and the Caribbean, the region has had to
compete with a remarkably crowded and challenging
foreign policy panorama. And amid the resulting
distraction, several state actors are once again vying for
influence in the Western Hemisphere.

Contemporary challenges—China
The primary threat to American interests in Latin
America comes from China, both because Beijing is
the greatest global challenge for American statecraft
and because its presence in the Western Hemisphere
is multifaceted and widespread. As part of a strategy
to increase its own influence and options in the region
while creating potential problems for the United
States close to home, China engages governments and
supports political models in the region that are hostile
to American interests, while also courting traditional
U.S. allies.
The leading edge of China’s involvement in the Western
Hemisphere is economic. For roughly a generation,
Beijing has been leveraging its massive domestic market
and vast financial resources to draw countries in the
region closer and pull them away from Washington. China
is now the region’s second-largest trade partner behind
the United States. While the United States still enjoys a
comfortable lead in this metric, its advantage has been
eroding since the turn of the century. Between 2000 and
2018, the percentage of Latin American exports going to
the United States dropped from 58 to 43 percent while it
increased from 1.1. to 12.4 percent with respect to China.
In fact, discounting Mexico, China already surpassed
the United States as the largest destination country for
the region’s exports.5 Importantly, China has linked
itself closely with the largest economic power in the
Western Hemisphere outside the United States—Brazil.
Beijing has become Brazil’s most important commercial
partner, doubling in size compared to the Brazil-U.S.
commercial relationship.6
China also uses its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) to
project its economic power and improve its geopolitical
position. Since its launch in 2013, BRI has become one
VOLUME 2 | JANUARY 2022

of the most ambitious global development programs in
history. According to Chinese officials, its rapid growth
in Latin America represents a “natural extension of the
21st Century Maritime Silk Road.”7 Thus far, 18 countries
in Latin America have signed on to BRI—including some
of the most prosperous countries in the region, such as
Chile.8
While BRI is attractive to recipient nations because
it purports to address real infrastructure needs and
other development shortfalls, the resulting Chinese
economic leverage can become a means of extracting
political concessions. For example, when Sri Lanka fell
into arrears on the loans it had taken from China (loans
other sources had declined due to risk), it was left with
no other option than to turn over the Hambantota Port,
plus thousands of acres of land surrounding it, to the
Chinese for 99 years.9 China may use the same tactic to
obtain strategic footholds in the Western Hemisphere,
perhaps taking advantage of high debt burdens owed by
small island nations in the Caribbean. Regionwide, the
acute debt crisis that could be the legacy of COVID-19
may provide further openings for predatory Chinese
finance throughout the region.
Technology is another weapon of Chinese influence in
Latin America. Huawei, the Chinese telecommunications
company, is one of the market leaders of mobile devices
in the Hemisphere. Huawei is also a top contender
for the upcoming 5G auctions in Brazil, Chile, and
Mexico. Although the company repeatedly claims its
independence from the Chinese state, the company
possesses an intentionally opaque corporate structure,
and Chinese law requires that Chinese entities “support,
assist and cooperate with state intelligence work.”10
Accordingly, the U.S. is attempting to persuade countries
in the Hemisphere to reconsider adopting Chinese
equipment. American officials have already warned
countries that adopting Huawei technology would make
information sharing and collaboration with the United
States difficult if not impossible.11 U.S. lawmakers
have also introduced legislation to restrict intelligence
sharing with countries that use Huawei equipment
in their 5G networks.12 Additionally, Washington has
offered economic incentives to try to tip the scale away
from Chinese companies. For example, the U.S. offered
Brazil, an erstwhile member of the “Clean Network,”
generous terms of finance to purchase 5G equipment
from other (non-American) sources.13
Although Chinese engagement in Latin America is
primarily economic in nature, military collaboration is
a growing aspect of Chinese activity in the region. Arms
sales, military training, and technical military support
allow the Chinese to build key strategic relationships
with the armed forces of countries in the United States’
Page 03
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shared neighborhood. The Chinese have sold equipment
to military and police forces from countries historically
opposed to the United States—such as Venezuela and
Cuba—as well as close American partners like Colombia
and Chile. The People’s Liberation Army (PLA) maintains
a growing presence in the region through training
and visits, which permits it greater familiarity with
countries’ operational frameworks and preparedness, as
well as their strategic doctrine.14 China has also focused
on ongoing training of the region’s military officers at
PRC institutions of military education, which should
familiarize and educate the upper brass in Chinese
military doctrine.15
More ominously, the PLA is rapidly building new
dual-use infrastructure or acquiring access to existing
dual-use infrastructure that can enhance its military
capabilities in the region. For example, China has
several dozen agreements to build or expand deep-water
ports in the region, and it constructed a space station
operated by the PLA in Neuquén Province, Argentina,
without Argentinian oversight. While the Chinese claim
that this installation is for peaceful space exploration,
the base has obvious dual-use potential as a tool for
espionage, and China does not permit the Argentines
to come near the facility.16 Quite ominously, China
has signed another agreement for a similar facility in
Santa Cruz Province; the strategic importance cannot
be overstated, as Santa Cruz lies just above the Strait
of Magellan, a major maritime chokepoint.17 Likewise,
China’s growing partnership with Panama may
eventually result in preferential access to the Panama
Canal, facilitating the movement of goods and people in
and out of the Hemisphere and inflicting a symbolic as
well as strategic blow to the United States. Two-thirds of
all ships transiting to and from the U.S. pass through the
Panama Canal.18
China is doing more than just developing its economic
and military presence in the region. The Chinese are also
applying soft power capabilities to make their burgeoning
influence seem less threatening.19 Vaccine diplomacy is
China’s latest soft power play in the Hemisphere. Even
though the Chinese government’s attempt to cover up
the outbreak of COVID-19 assisted the virus in its spread
worldwide, China is now repairing (and even enhancing)
its reputation by providing personal protective
equipment (PPE) and vaccines against the virus to Latin
American countries. Even Brazil, whose president is
rhetorically quite hostile to China, has been left with no
other option than to acquire China’s Sinovac vaccine,
lest Brazil be without vaccine.20 And although Chinese
officials claim that Beijing “never seeks geopolitical
goals and economic interests” in exchange for vaccines,
this does not seem to be the case.21 Shortly after initial
VOLUME 2 | JANUARY 2022

talks on the possibility of Brazil receiving vaccines from
China, Brazil announced the rules for its 5G auction,
which allowed Huawei to participate—reversing earlier
comments by government officials that seemed to favor
barring the Chinese company and committing Brazil to
the United States’ “Clean Network” initiative.22 China
also slowed its vaccine delivery schedule of vaccines after
a diplomatic spat between the president’s son, Federal
Deputy Eduardo Bolsonaro, and Chinese ambassador to
Brazil, Yang Wanming.

Contemporary challenges—Russia
Russia is a secondary threat to American interests in
Latin America, as overall, Russian power is more limited
and less multidimensional than China’s. Nonetheless,
since the early 2000s Russia has publicly expressed
interest in expanding its presence in the region.
Moscow’s 2016 Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian
Federation proclaims: “Russia remains committed to the
comprehensive strengthening of relations with the Latin
American and Caribbean States taking into account the
growing role of this region in global affairs.”23
Most evidence suggests that Russia views its presence
in Latin America primarily as a modest rejoinder to
American influence in Russia’s near abroad—a way
of gaining strategic leverage on the United States and
diverting its geopolitical energies. Contrary to China’s
more robust efforts, however, Russia has circumscribed
its activity and sought to expand its influence in the
Western Hemisphere primarily with countries that have
been historically opposed to the United States and with
regimes of an illiberal nature. (Unlike China, it has little to
offer healthier, more politically stable and liberal states.)
Russia has been actively involved with the grouping of
states in the Bolivarian Alliance for the Peoples of Our
America (ALBA)—most notably Venezuela, Cuba, and
Nicaragua.
Perhaps the primary way Russia supports Latin
America’s illiberal regimes is with military assistance,
through arms sales, technical support, and military
training and visits.24 Nicaragua serves as a prominent
example. Russia provides practically all of Nicaragua’s
armaments, many of which became key instruments
of terror in Nicaragua’s 2018 uprising and the Ortega
regime’s brutal suppression of it. (For instance, Dragunov
sniper rifles sold to the Nicaraguan Army ended up
in the hands of well-trained paramilitary groups that
used them to fire indiscriminately at protestors.) In
2014, the Russian military opened a training facility in
Nicaragua, where numerous Russian military personnel
are stationed—purportedly for joint military exercises
and anti-trafficking efforts, but possibly to aid President
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Daniel Ortega’s efforts to suppress political opposition. A
year later, Nicaragua permitted Russian warships access
to Nicaraguan ports and, in 2017, Nicaragua agreed
to allow Russia to build a Global Navigation Satellite
System (GLONASS) station—conveniently stationed
in proximity to the U.S. Embassy in Managua—that is
likely used for intelligence gathering.25 Russia has grown
its influence in Nicaragua as the Ortega regime’s plans
to install a family dynasty have become clear. Most
recently, it has revealed an agreement to share cyber
tools with Nicaragua to bolster regime resilience and
potentially spy on opposition figures.26
Disinformation and propaganda are also powerful
and fine-tuned Russian tools. They allow Russia to
manipulate public opinion and spread anti-western
sentiment throughout the region—especially toward the
United States. Russian state-owned news outlets have
expanded their reach in Latin America with Spanish
television and news networks such as Russia Today en
Español and Sputnik Mundo. According to its website,
Russia Today en Español reaches 18 million people a
week in ten different Latin American countries and has
more than 3 billion total views on its YouTube channel.27
As with Chinese outlets, regional news organizations
often republish many of these stories.
In the economic realm, Russian trade with the Hemisphere
is not substantial. Nevertheless, Russia plays a significant
role in providing governments in the region financial
support and helping them circumvent sanctions. Like
China, Russia provides loans to friendly regimes with few
strings attached and is flexible with repayment, including
payment in-kind (as it does with Venezuelan crude). In
2015, Russia extended a $1.5 billion loan to Cuba (the
largest since the fall of the Soviet Union) with a generous
interest rate to build large power plants on the island.28 A
mere year earlier, Russia excused 90% of Cuba’s Sovietera debt totaling over $30 billion.29
Russian assistance with sanctions evasion is critical
for the survival of certain countries in the Hemisphere,
notably Venezuela. For example, after the U.S. imposed
sanctions on Venezuela’s state-owned oil company,
Petróleos de Venezuela (PDVSA), Russia’s state-owned
oil company, Rosneft continued to do business with
PDVSA. (The U.S. later designated Rosneft Trading and
TNK Trading, the Swiss-based Russian subsidiaries in
question in these endeavors, for sanctions.) Russia also
appears to have been quietly involved with Venezuela’s
effort to design a national cryptocurrency, called the
Petro, to help the Maduro regime avoid international
sanctions.30 While the Petro has been unsuccessful due
to bureaucratic incompetency and lack of domestic
and international enthusiasm, Russia will continue to
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aid its beleaguered ally in the effort to evade American
economic leverage.31

Principles for a U.S. Response
Geopolitics are back in Latin America, with greatpower rivals seeking to use the Western Hemisphere
as a point of strategic leverage against the United
States. The United States will need a long-term,
strategic response. There appears to be some prospect
that the region will receive greater relative priority
in U.S. policy: The Biden administration implicitly
ranked the Western Hemisphere above the Middle
East in its Interim National Security Strategic
Guidance. Nonetheless, short of a major crisis, there
is little likelihood that the absolute level of resources
the region receives will increase dramatically in the
near-term. With this in mind, we offer a few basic
principles for a strategic response to the deterioration
of American influence in the region, one that is
mindful of resource constraints and the limits of what
Washington can achieve within them.
First, track extra-hemispheric influence more
systematically. The U.S. government will need a
more complete cataloguing of great-power activity and
presence in its shared neighborhood, as one recent bill
before the U.S. Congress requires.32 Just as important
will be establishing qualitative and quantitative metrics
to monitor and evaluate the presence of its geopolitical
rivals in the Western Hemisphere. Lacking such metrics,
policymaking will continue to be conducted on an adhoc basis. Given the multi-dimensional nature of great
power competition illuminated in this report, developing
such measurements is not a straightforward endeavor.
However, proximity and threat level (regarding both
military and economic challenges to the United States)
should be guiding principles in this effort to establish
thresholds for greater action. In particular, the U.S.
would be wise to systematically monitor the transfer
of dual-use infrastructure and technology to the region
and determine at what point such transfers would cross
a critical threshold, presenting a point of significant
strategic leverage against core American interests.33
Second, track vulnerabilities as well as strengths.
The expansion of Chinese and Russian influence in
Latin American and the Caribbean has not always been
a popular phenomenon. Industries and enterprises have
been hurt by economic competition; support for corrupt
and illiberal regimes has tarnished the reputation of
China and Russia with some local populations. Heavyhanded vaccine diplomacy (with substandard quality
vaccines and defective personal protective equipment
to boot) could create further vulnerabilities for China
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in particular (and Russia, to a lesser extent). Studying
which aspects of these countries’ regional presence create
diplomatic or soft-power vulnerabilities is a starting
point for developing a more competitive response.
Third, engage on security issues of greatest
concern to local governments and peoples. The
United States must present itself as the preferred partner
to help countries in the Western Hemisphere address
their security concerns. Washington has had some
success in this regard in the past, with wide-ranging
security assistance programs such as Plan Colombia and
the US-Mexico Merida Initiative. In other cases, however,
American policy initiatives have focused on issues—
such as curbing migration—of comparatively lower
concern to regional partners. To compete effectively,
the United States must also prioritize the preferred
security challenges of its partners—and understand that
those challenges are quickly shifting. The burgeoning
threat represented by China’s highly subsidized illegal,
unregulated, and unreported (IUU) fishing activities in
sensitive ecological waters off the Pacific Coast of South
America is but one example of the rapidly evolving
nature of the region’s security environment.34
Fourth, counter the authoritarian playbook.
While the presence of great-power rivals has often
exacerbated political instability and furthered democratic
backsliding in Latin America and the Caribbean, the
truth is that preexisting political tensions, endemic
corruption, and a poor record of governance in many
countries throughout the region leaves them vulnerable
to Chinese and Russian influence. In the domestic
context, there is a well-worn playbook that leads to
authoritarianism, which includes electoral reengineering,
suffocation of civil society and the corruption of the
media’s independence, and the weakening of political
opposition and political institutions, capped off by the
politicization of judiciaries and military and police
forces. Sometimes, leaders following the authoritarian
playbook even consolidate their gains by amending or
rewriting their country’s constitution.35 Fortunately,
the tools inherent in the Inter-American Democratic
Charter can help to sound a powerful tocsin against
democratic backsliding and the authoritarian playbook.
Maintaining the largely democratic nature of the region
and focusing on improving the quality of governance
and political institutions can both reduce the openings
for the authoritarian playbook and limit opportunities
for great-power rivals to use backsliding democracies
and nascent autocracies as convenient entry points into
America’s shared neighborhood.
Fifth, don’t make it all about China. There is no
question that American interest in Latin America and the
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Caribbean rises when perceptions of extra-hemispheric
threats become more acute. But just as the United States
sometimes misfired, during the early Cold War, by
focusing excessively on the dangers of communism—as
opposed to aspirations for local political and economic
progress—in the developing regions, it is a mistake to
convey the impression that Washington cares about the
Western Hemisphere only because of the Chinese or
Russian threats. Similarly, while there are times when
public critiques of Chinese policies by U.S. officials are
entirely warranted, another lesson of the Cold War is that
those critiques are often more effective when delivered
by friendly local actors rather than by the United States
itself.
Sixth, emphasize cost-effective means of
competition. When resources are relatively scarce,
the United States will need to find ways of increasing
the bang it receives for each buck. There are a variety
of possibilities. IMET (International Military Education
and Training) initiatives are an inexpensive means
of building relationships with the next generation of
Latin American military leaders—relationships that
the United States is in growing danger of not having in
the future. Visits by high-level American officials that
have not historically received much attention from the
United States, can also play an outsized role in warding
off rivals’ influence. Showing up does matter: Taiwan,
for example, has used this sort of approach to maintain
is diplomatic toehold in the region.
Seventh, leverage non-governmental advantages.
Great-power competition encompasses more than
just state action. This is where the United States can
leverage asymmetric advantages. The United States
has deep cultural, political, and historical ties with its
southern neighbors, exemplified by the large number
of immigrants and diaspora groups in the United
States who hail from the region. These immigrants and
their decedents have a deep sense of patriotism that
rivals (and often surpasses) those of native-born U.S.
citizens.36 Facilitating people-to-people diplomacy—by
relaxing travel restrictions, expanding trade links, or
professional development programs through publicprivate partnerships—can be a cost-efficient way for the
United States to strengthen its hemispheric relationships
and limit the influence of its great-power rivals.
Eighth, understand that you ultimately get
what you pay for. Most analyses of deteriorating
U.S. influence in Latin America and the Caribbean focus
on the resource-poor approach Washington has taken
to the region over the past 30 years, and call for a more
holistic, better-supported strategy. We have no reason
to differ from this basic recommendation.
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Most, although not all, countries in Latin America and
the Caribbean still see the United States as a preferred
partner on many issues of concern and regret that there
are not greater opportunities to engage with Washington
on these issues. Defending American interests in the
region will indeed require a whole-of-government effort
to provide countries in Latin America and the Caribbean
with alternatives to economic, diplomatic, and military
reliance on extra-hemispheric rivals, in areas such as
investment, 5G telecommunications, strengthening
governance, pushing for greater transparency (in
development and other projects), and highlighting
the predatory aspects of China’s advance while not
appearing to block countries from taking advantage of
the trade and investment resources Beijing can offer. In
the coming years, the United States will likely need to
pursue competition on a strictly limited budget. But if
it does not make greater preventive investments in the
region now, it may once again experience the historical
pattern of having to make far greater compensatory
investments once key tipping points have been reached
and emerging strategic challenges have become
impossible to ignore.
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CHINA’S COVID-19 DIPLOMACY IN LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN:
MOTIVATIONS AND METHODS
Margaret Myers

B

eginning in February 2020, China’s diplomatic
community—together with Chinese provincial
and municipal governments, businesses, and media
outlets—set forth to shape opinions of China in the Latin
American and Caribbean (LAC) region, when many
in LAC had mixed views of China and its relationship
with COVID-19. In the following months, China engaged
not only in the delivery of personal protective equipment
(PPE) and, more recently, vaccines to LAC countries but
also launched an extensive messaging campaign, carried
out through traditional and social media by Chinese
embassies and media outlets across the region.  
Analysis of trends in China’s coronavirus-era engagement with LAC reveals striking developments in
China’s aid delivery and public messaging toward the region and also in China’s broader approach to LAC relations. China’s engagement with LAC amid the pandemic
can be divided into two distinct phases.
•

•

The first of these was most evident from February
to around September 2020. It consisted of sales and
donations of medical equipment and other forms
of cooperation and assistance, such as advisory
services and consultations between medical professionals from China and LAC nations, and some
instances of cooperation on vaccine testing and development.1  
Based on a review of 470 announcements of Chinese
PPE deliveries announced in Chinese, Latin American, and other media sources—as well as Chinese
embassy Twitter accounts2 —the pace of PPE deliveries slowed considerably after summer 2020 (see
Figure 1), as China focused more extensively on
vaccine development and distribution—the second
phase in China’s COVID-19 outreach.  

China’s COVID-19 assistance is meant to achieve
wide-ranging objectives. In addition to humanitarian
motivations, which are frequently underscored by Chinese officials and generally supported at home by the
Chinese public,3 China’s COVID-19 aid and broader
economic outreach have also sought to reinforce and
strengthen bilateral ties throughout the region—to ensure, above all, that China emerges from the pandemic
with its image generally intact, and to simultaneously
advance some of China’s commercial objectives and policy interests, including the political isolation of Taiwan.  
For the companies involved in China’s international outreach, the pandemic was an opportunity to highlight their commitment to those countries and communities where they operate. For China’s tech firms, the
VOLUME 2 | JANUARY 2022

pandemic also provided an opportunity to showcase new
biomedical technologies and artificial intelligence-enabled diagnostic capabilities.
In the early months of the pandemic, China employed a notably decentralized aid campaign, leveraging
wide-ranging Chinese actors and on-the-ground networks to deliver medical supplies to LAC nations.  
It entailed loosely coordinated engagement
by wide-ranging Chinese actors, including Chinese embassies, companies, provincial government authorities,
networks of overseas Chinese communities, and quasi-governmental organizations, such as the Chinese Red
Cross. This approach was targeted and flexible, allowing
for often-impromptu donations to hard-hit communities, local organizations, and individuals capable of influencing China’s broader commercial and political interests.
China’s initial “aid blitz,” whether delivered by
Chinese companies, embassies, overseas communities,
the Chinese Red Cross, or other actors, was carried out
at a pivotal moment for global opinion on China and
COVID-19.  
Amid mounting critiques and accusations, China
sought to position itself in LAC and other regions as a
responsible actor and proponent of cooperation at
a moment of global crisis.4 Much of this work fell to
China’s embassies, which, in addition to coordinating donations and sales of PPE and vaccines, labored
throughout the pandemic to convey specific messages
about China’s experience with the coronavirus and its
pandemic outreach.
Of interest in China’s communications campaign
was an increase in assertive messaging in the early
months of the pandemic, characteristic of the so-called
“wolf warrior” diplomacy that featured prominently in
academic and policy accounts of China’s external communications in spring 2020. In most cases, China’s
sharp-edged defensive rhetoric was accompanied by
promotional messaging, which, along with an emphasis
on cooperation and multilateralism, has since dominated China’s communications with the region.  
Recent efforts to isolate Taiwan mark a clearer-than-ever departure in LAC from China’s long-standing policy of noninterference. China has been effective,
in the short term at least, in using its role as a provider
of vaccines to the region to quell criticism of China and
influence Taiwan-related policymaking.  
China, directly and indirectly, encouraged Taiwan’s
allies to rethink their diplomatic allegiances. Beijing
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suggested that Honduras seek a “diplomatic bridge”
to purchase Chinese vaccines, for instance.5 China also
sought to influence Taiwan’s relations with Paraguay
by conditioning the transfer of vaccines on changes
in those countries’ Taiwan policies. Guyana received
200,000 doses of Chinese vaccine after deciding to close
a new commercial office with Taiwan.  
Vaccines have also been used to reward or discourage other LAC government actions. In Brazil,
China reportedly halted the shipment of raw materials
necessary for the São Paulo-based Butantan Institute
to produce China’s CoronaVac vaccine6 after President Jair Bolsonaro suggested that China disseminated
COVID-19 as a tactic of biological warfare.7

influence in the region. We noted a substantial overall increase in LAC tweets about China during the
pandemic. Before the pandemic, 41,098 geo-referenced tweets mentioned China. More than three
times as many (144,181 tweets) referenced China
during the pandemic. The terms used in these tweets
were not strongly positively or negatively weighted,
however.11

•

The effects of China’s outreach may be more striking in the commercial realm in LAC, to the extent
that Chinese companies have indeed solidified or
generated new ties amid the pandemic. Any benefits to Chinese companies from their extended outreach could take considerable time to materialize,
however, and will undoubtedly vary on a company-by-company basis. LAC Twitter users referenced
Huawei fewer times during the pandemic (5,376
tweets) than before (7,870 tweets), despite the company’s relatively robust pandemic outreach.

•

As Financial Times Latin America Editor Michael
Stott noted in a May 2021 Inter-American Dialogue
event, it is probable that neither China nor U.S.-China competition are foremost for most in LAC at this
juncture. LAC leaders, in most cases, are seeking
critical COVID-19 solutions, regardless of their
source.  

Despite the efforts of wide-ranging Chinese actors,
China’s COVID-19 diplomacy has been more successful
in advancing some of China’s objectives than others.

•

China’s extensive messaging campaigns and medical assistance arguably helped avoid an image crisis
at the pandemic’s onset.  

•

China’s decentralized approach provided it with
considerable flexibility and visibility when operating
in LAC. By deploying on-the-ground assets to support China’s diplomatic objectives, China was able
to respond in near real-time to developments in the
region, changing course as needed.

•

China’s LAC-based entities were also able to target
the delivery of numerous, small donations to specific communities and individuals, in occasional support of broader commercial and political interests.

•

China’s approach was also occasionally problematic,
however. Francisco Urdinez has noted the challenges of coordinating China’s decentralized approach,
including occasional miscommunications and diplomatic blunders.8 In Chile, poor coordination among
Chinese actors resulted in a serious misunderstanding with Chilean officials.9 Courting LAC officials
with PPE kits and vaccines is also a problematic and
potentially corruption-inducing practice.  

•

•

China’s experiment with “wolf warrior”-type messaging may have had unintended effects, as Yale
University’s Daniel C. Mattingly and James Sundquist noted. Wolf warrior diplomacy, they say, has
backfired on numerous occasions.10
Our analysis of tweets from the LAC region suggests
that while LAC audiences possibly view China as
more impactful on LAC affairs than before the pandemic, they are still ambivalent about China and its
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Ultimately, this exercise has been an experimental
one for China, whether through the use of an impromptu
and often-decentralized aid campaign, the development
of new medical technologies, or by employing novel approaches to communications with the region. China’s
approach has supported numerous objectives, whether
economic or diplomatic, but wide-ranging factors will
determine the overall impact of Chinese outreach. These
include the effectiveness of Chinese vaccines and the
extent of commitments by partner nations during the
pandemic and after, as LAC prepares for a period of prolonged economic and social recovery.  
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THE MISLEADING TRUTHS OF RUSSIA’S STRATEGIC COMMUNICATION IN
LATIN AMERICA
Vladimir Rouvinski
“[Russia needs] a channel that people are used to; one
they like and [that can be ready to expose its audience
to the required information feed]. In a sense, not having your own foreign broadcasting is like not having
a ministry of defense. When there is no war, it seems
like [media in foreign languages] is not needed. But […]
when there is war, this is directly critical. But you can’t
create an army a week before the war has begun.”
Margarita Simonyan (RT editor-in-chief), “Russian
media from inside,” Afisha Daily, October 18, 2011
Russia’s return to the Western Hemisphere

D

uring the Cold War, Latin America and the Caribbean served as a stage for power competition
between the United States and the Soviet Union. The
logic of a bipolar world guided the policy design of
Washington and Moscow. After the 1991 collapse of
the Soviet Union, new Russia lost its interest in the
region. Facing enormous economic difficulties, the
government of Boris Yeltsin collaborated with the
United States on various international agenda topics.
Yet, at the beginning of the new century, under the
government of Vladimir Putin, Russia returned to the
Western Hemisphere. While there are several reasons
behind Russia’s return, the notion of reciprocity is the
foremost factor.
The majority of the elites that govern Russia today view
the entire Western Hemisphere as Washington’s priority area of political, economic, and social concern. Similarly, the top officials of Putin’s government consider the
territory of the former Soviet Union, a “near abroad,” as
the most important geographical area outside Russia’s
borders. Russian leadership is convinced that Moscow has the right to have special interests in this “near
abroad” because of historical, cultural, and economic
ties. Hence, post-Soviet Russian leaders insist that all
governments outside the region must consider Russia’s
special interests before advancing their relations with
the countries of the former Soviet Union.
Symbolic reciprocity has multiple manifestations in the
realm of Russian foreign policy. First, it is an opportunity for Putin’s government to show that Russia can respond reciprocally to what is perceived by the Russian
elites as destructive actions by the U.S. government in
Moscow’s “near abroad.” For example, during the crisis
in Georgia in 2008, the Russian government expressed
its concerns regarding the U.S. naval presence in the
Black Sea and the support Washington offered to anti-Russian forces.1 Moscow sent its strategic bombers
and naval ships to the Western Hemisphere right after
the five-day war between Russia and Georgia in 2008.
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Moreover, the signs of increased military cooperation
with Nicaragua, Venezuela, and Cuba coincided with
the annexation of Crimea in 2014 and U.S. support of
Kyiv.2 The active participation of Moscow in Venezuela’s latest crisis is yet another manifestation of the
symbolic reciprocity approach in Latin America. At the
same time—and since Russia has limited conventional
resources—it resorts more frequently to asymmetrical
methods than traditional engagement to pursue a policy of reciprocity. Strategic communication is one of the
tools of that policy.
The modus operandi of Russia’s strategic
communication
In today’s globalized world, states use strategic communication to enhance their capabilities abroad and facilitate foreign policy objectives via long-established activities, including public diplomacy, public affairs, nation
branding, and information operations. After Putin came
to power, Moscow opted not simply to broaden the scope
of its communication overseas but to exercise “sharp
power” through solid mechanisms that could effectively
disseminate desired values, interests, and goals. Coined
by Christopher Walker and Jessica Ludwig,3 sharp power describes efforts that seek to pierce, penetrate, and
perforate the political and information environments
of targeted countries. In this context, Russian strategic
communication in Latin America is Moscow’s principal
vehicle of sharp power. It enables the Putin government
to cut into the fabric of Latin American society, amplifying existing political divisions, questioning liberal
democratic order, and diminishing U.S. influence in the
region.
Although contemporary global communication may use
various channels to reach targeted audiences, Russia’s
modus operandi in Latin America relies heavily on government-controlled mass media, namely, RT television
networks and the Sputnik news agency in Spanish. As
part of Putin’s foreign strategy, Russian foreign-language broadcasting targets viewers in Latin America
because Moscow presumes it is easier to attract new
audiences there than compete with established media outlets in the United States and Western Europe.
As globalization and economic liberalization increased
cultural exchanges in the southern part of the Western
Hemisphere in the 1990s and 2000s, Latin Americans
requested broader coverage of political and international topics than the mainstream local media offered.
Nevertheless, the offer remained limited.4 Hence, from
the Russian perspective, media markets would respond
favorably to new international broadcasters in Spanish
if the new outlets would provide a different perspective on critical subjects of public interest. Although RT
started in 2005 by broadcasting in English to viewers
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in English-speaking Western countries, it later turned a
considerable share of its attention to Latin America. The
success of Russian efforts to reach a wider audience is
evident by the number of RT’s followers on the internet,
affiliated TV cable providers, and geographical scope.
In 2021, only 12 years after its first Spanish-language
broadcast, RT is readily available everywhere in the
region. In some cases, the channel is made available
as part of public TV broadcasting systems (Argentina,
Venezuela, and Cuba) or as part of the state satellite
system (Bolivia). In other countries, such as Colombia,
hundreds of small local cable networks retransmit RT
programming in addition to Claro, the principal cable
provider in the country. Moreover, RT pays cable operators to carry its signal on allied networks, making it difficult to end collaboration with Moscow; in many cases,
Russian funding helps smaller operators survive in the
market. RT also has agreements to broadcast programs
on local channels; viewers are often unaware the information they receive comes from Russia. This approach
allows RT to extend the reach of Russia’s strategic communication to potentially millions of additional viewers
in Latin America. Besides, RT is freely available 24 hours
per day and online. As a result, in September 2021, RT in
Spanish on Facebook5 had more than 18 million followers. The RT YouTube channel in Spanish had over five
million subscribers,6 and RT Play in Spanish on Facebook had more than six million.7 Finally, more than 3.5
million people follow RT in Spanish’s Twitter account.
However, the analysis of the presence of Russia’s government-sponsored media would be incomplete without
mentioning the Sputnik news agency. This media outlet
maintains its own websites in addition to traditional and
digital radio broadcasting in three-dozen languages, but
it is part of the same organizational framework as RT.
Sputnik’s Spanish-language branch is Sputnik Mundo.8
Despite the diversity of programs and media platforms,
a close examination of the content produced by RT in
Spanish and Sputnik Mundo reveals several standard
features. First, there is the inclusion of politically unrelated news and reports like sensationalized bulletins in
its feeds. This strategy aims to recruit new followers who
otherwise might not be interested in getting information
from RT or Sputnik. It also provides Russia with the potential to use a CNN-like effect understood as real-time
communication to provoke the desired response from
foreign audiences. Second, the main political narratives
employed by Russian media for foreign audiences support the official position of the Russian government. It
is not to say that RT and Sputnik focus exclusively on
Russia’s foreign policy agenda. Yet, it is a clear priority
of its information coverage. Third, RT’s global “information menu” is designed to take advantage of opportuniVOLUME 2 | JANUARY 2022

ties unique to each region. In Latin America, many of
RT’s politically sensitive programs align with narratives
promoted by political forces to the left of the political
spectrum. However, some other programs, which have
millions of views, often are anchored by celebrities associated with political forces other than the Latin American
left. For instance, during the 2018 World Cup in Russia,
RT hired Carlos Valderrama, one of South America’s
most recognizable soccer players. Regarding Colombian politics, Valderrama supported the right-centrist U
party of then-Colombian President Juan Manuel Santos.
With Latin American societies becoming ideologically
more polarized, RT’s potential looks promising for Moscow. By using its media outlets, Russia can reach out to
various segments of the population and skillfully apply
sharp power by questioning established facts related to
sensitive topics for some viewers. This approach is particularly noticeable when it comes to the coverage of
U.S.-related developments.
RT in Spanish and Sputnik Mundo’s narratives
While the narratives delivered through RT and other
news agencies emphasized the role of Russia as a global
player, they also stressed that the United States resisted
the process of Russia regaining its influence in the international arena and opposed building a new multipolar
order with Latin American partners. Moscow is seeking to misinform viewers regarding U.S. policy on other
topics, including migration, liberal democracy, and economic and social issues. In recent years, two items have
been foremost on that agenda: the crisis in Venezuela
and the COVID-19 pandemic.
The most important Venezuela-related narrative fits
perfectly with the logic of symbolic reciprocity: “The
United States wants regime change.” Russian media
interprets the opposition struggle as Washington’s attempt to change the unfriendly regime in Caracas, identical to the “color revolutions” in Russia’s “near abroad.”
According to Russian government-controlled media,
these efforts bring about the deterioration of living standards, the suffering of ordinary people, and widespread
violence. Furthermore, as part of Russia’s strategic communication agenda, RT is mobilized to provide information backing Nicolás Maduro’s regime while justifying
Moscow’s aid to Caracas as a necessary move to protect
the world “against malign U.S. intentions.” RT aimed to
discredit Juan Guaidó and cast doubts on his legitimacy
and capacity to govern. Since the beginning of the latest crisis in Venezuela in January 2019, the channel has
aired more than 300 reports with Guaidó’s name in the
headlines of its newsfeed. Another story line is dedicated to the impact of U.S. sanctions. RT tried to convince
its viewers that the main reason behind Venezuela’s
catastrophic situation was not the disastrous economic
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policy of the Chavista government but, rather, U.S. sanctions. In this context, RT dedicated numerous reports to
praising the efforts of Maduro’s government to govern
the country with timely assistance offered by Moscow.
The COVID-19-related strategic communication originating in Russia and destined for Latin America took
full advantage of the introduction of the “Sputnik-V”
vaccine and the beginning of the “COVID vaccine race.”
First, the news of the Sputnik-V vaccine was interpreted
as evidence of Russia being one of the most technologically advanced nations, which is often denied because of
bad publicity originated in the Western media. In addition, RT and Sputnik Mundo alleged that pro-U.S. Latin
American governments were unwilling to acquire the
Russian vaccine—not because it does not comply with
the necessary protocols and tests, but because of their
political ties with Washington. This type of strategy has
created several noticeable tensions in the Latin American information space. In December 2020, for example,
RT’s Inna Afinogenova skillfully engaged the popular
Colombian newsmaker Vicky Davila in a public debate
about the role of Russian media in Latin America when
reporting on sensitive topics like COVID-19. The debate
attracted the attention of many viewers who otherwise
would be unaware of RT in Spanish. In 2021, Russia
signed agreements to start producing the Sputnik vaccine in Argentina and negotiating the delivery of Russian vaccines to other Latin American countries. Therefore, there is little doubt that Moscow will continue to
exploit politically sensitive topics such as the COVID-19
vaccine.
Beyond disseminating Moscow’s overarching
narratives in Latin America
By 2021, RT and other Russian government-sponsored
media had become a familiar source of information in
the Spanish-speaking world of the Americas. The Kremlin managed to restore the possibility of being exposed
to an alternative view to the one promoted by the United
States and democratic governments in the region for the
first time since the dissolution of the Soviet propaganda
machine. Contemporary Russian information coverage
is once again an aggressive, purposeful intervention in
the international media space that goes beyond the dissemination of Moscow’s overarching narratives.
One of the factors behind RT’s success in Latin America is the public’s lack of understanding of the nature
of Moscow’s interest in the region’s information space.
Many Latin Americans perceive the growing incidence
of Russian media as something “normal,” part of the exercise of freedom of expression and diversity of opinions.
However, it is part of a foreign policy strategy designed
to achieve specific objectives by the Putin government.
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Russia thrives on communicating desired explanations
for important developments with comfortable ease and
makes it difficult for democratic governments to repair
the damage. The sharing of democratic values among
the countries of the Western Hemisphere is the key to
security in the region; the prevalence of like-minded democracies makes the political geography of the Western
Hemisphere unique. Since Russia is not a democracy,
RT and Sputnik Mundo often refer to democracy as a
political regime with many weaknesses. In this context,
one of the long-term goals of Russia in Latin America
is to carry out continuous strategic communication via
government-controlled outlets to undermine the idea of
democratic order.
The advance of Russia’s strategic communication in Latin America has almost no opposition. There have been
only a few public debates on RT and Sputnik in the regional information space. Therefore, it is necessary to
continue raising the awareness of decision-makers and
the Latin American public regarding the nature of Russia’s government-controlled mass media. At the same
time, it is vital to challenge Russia’s strategic communication by escalating government-led efforts. While the
United States promotes its political culture by supporting democratic movements and local mass media in Latin America, U.S. media consists of predominantly commercial outlets. The mainstream media in English is the
first choice of highly educated Latin Americans, a minority in the region. CNN en Español (2.5 million subscribers on YouTube, many based in the United States),
CNN Chile (0.5 million subscribers), CNN Radio Argentina, and several others have established impressive audiences. Still, their further growth depends on market
factors. Currently, U.S. government-sponsored information outlets have limited reach in the region. For instance, as of September 2021, Voice of America in Spanish has only 180,000 subscribers on YouTube compared
to the millions of followers of RT and Sputnik. From this
perspective, Russia’s strategic communications have
a broader reach to those segments of Latin American
societies that—in the context of growing economic and
social difficulties in the region—might be willing to endorse views originating in Moscow.
Despite some similarities, overall, it is difficult to consider the current confrontation of Putin with the West
as a new cold war. Post-Soviet Russia neither military
nor economically matches the USSR, and the Kremlin’s
objectives are different from those promoted by Soviet
leadership. Nevertheless, many Russian decision-makers consider that Russia is at war—not a “hot war,” but
a new kind of confrontation characterized by a comparable level of symbolic tension with the United States
and its allies as during the Cold War. Moreover, elites
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in Moscow are convinced there is little hope the pressure will ease anytime soon. In this context, Russia will
attempt to sustain and expand its strategic communication in Latin America via RT in Spanish, Sputnik Mundo, and other media outlets as a cost-effective tool of its
foreign policy.
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ENVIRONMENTAL EXPLANATIONS OF CENTRAL AMERICAN MIGRATION: CHALLENGES
AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE DEVELOPMENT OF PUBLIC POLICIES.
Betilde Muñoz-Pogossian &
Diego Chaves-González

M

igrants from Central America have moved in large
numbers in recent years. According to the most recent Global Trends Report of the United Nations High
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), the total number
of asylum seekers, refugees, internally displaced persons, and returnees from Central America was 107,407
in 2014, while a total of 905,796 were registered by 2019.
The arrival of so many internally displaced populations
(IDPs), migrants, and refugees has created challenges
and opportunities for countries in the region. Natural
disasters and the COVID-19 pandemic have only added
complexity to the situation.
As it has become clear that many displaced migrants
will remain abroad for an extended period, if not permanently, the focus has begun to shift from the provision
of humanitarian aid to understanding the root causes
of migration to strengthen the countries of origin preparedness, infrastructure, access to services, and institutional reforms to address the situation. These measures
hold the potential to benefit the displaced populations,
migrants and refugees, and the communities in which
they live by boosting economic development and social
equity and reinforcing social cohesion.
To examine the link between climate change and human
mobility of migrants and refugees in this region, this
article analyzes data from the Internal Displacement
Monitoring Centre (IDMC), Armed Conflict Location &
Event Data Project (ACLED), United Nations Office on
Drugs and Crime (UNODC) studies, and various data
from other sources, reports, and additional research
resources. The report explores the correlation between
three key dimensions that could trigger factors for human mobility northward—natural disasters, internal
displacement, and violence—across the three Northern
Triangle countries (El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras). Together they comprise 86 percent of Central
Americans arriving at U.S. borders, and as of 2017, eight
percent of the United States’ 44.5 million immigrants.1

This study also examines the correlation of these variables across time, considering the accumulation (sum)
of episodes in three years of variable b, which has a
correlating effect on variable a. For example, when
correlating natural disasters in any given year with the
number of internally displaced population, this investigation totaled the number of internal displacements in
the three consecutive year period and then correlated
this number with the natural disasters that happened at
any given year.
Consequently, this research looked at answering the
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following questions: is there a connection between the
increase in the frequency and severity of climate events
in Central America and migration? How would this relationship come about? What role does internal migration
play? And what impact does the forced internal displacement of these populations affected by climate events
have on community social and security conditions? Can
internal displacement explain violence in these countries? And how do these impact these populations’ move
toward the North?
The article answered these questions by answering
whether internal displacement caused by natural
events is an underlying factor that incubates violence
and social instability, and if forced migration northward stimulated by violence should also be associated
with the frequency of natural events.  
The analysis suggests all variables correlate positively.
However, correlations are stronger when analyzing internal displacement and violence and violence with out-migration. The data and analysis of the findings presented
in this report provide a valuable indication of trends and
insights to support effective policymaking in the region.
These were then crossed following the transitivity principle.2 In this case, the hypothesis is that if natural disasters correlate with internal displacement in the Northern Triangle countries, they could increase the number
of homicides (used as a proxy for violence) in the region.
The increase in violence could be correlated with migration toward northern countries (Mexico, the United
States, and Canada). Two important caveats to keep in
mind is that correlation does not imply causation. Although there might be a correlation between the variables, one cannot make any claims of causality between
the different variables solely based on the existence of
this correlation. Secondly, we discovered a limitation of
available data in this case, which could provide an important opportunity to identify new gaps in the prior
literature and present the need for further development
in this area of study. These two caveats are explored further in the following sections.

Results
The results corroborate previous studies relating to the
relationship between migration, internal displacement,
conflict, and natural disasters. After running the four different correlations that this report proposes, the findings
suggest a weak but positive correlation between natural
disasters and internal displacement. In other words, the
findings indicate that the existence of floods, hurricanes,
or earthquakes, among other natural events, may not be
the only determinant of internal displacement in these
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three countries. Still, it is definitively influencing people’s decision to move. As more variables are included
in the correlations and more factors are considered, the
correlations get more potent, as Figure 1 shows.
When assessing the second correlation between internal
displacement due to natural disasters and homicide, the
correlation coefficient is 0.7. This shows that the relationship between internal displacement caused by natural
disasters and homicide is strong. This correlation coefficient was found by comparing the three-year sum of the
internally displaced people due to natural disasters in each
country with the total homicides in the region. In other
words, there is evidence that internal displacement caused
by natural disasters in these three countries may exacerbate violence measured by the number of homicides occurring in communities that have received IDPs due to natural
disasters. Since this correlation between IDPs due to natural events and homicides is strong, this study recommends
further studies that account for other factors and use alternative methodologies such as linear regressions.
Moreover, there is a correlation between homicide and
migration. The correlation coefficient, in this case, is 0.8.
When testing for the significance of this coefficient, the
p-value was 0.031. Given these results, there is an essential and strong correlation between homicide and migration toward the North. What Figure 1 suggests, then, is
that this study shows strong results when it comes to the
correlation between homicide and migration toward the

northern countries. As it still exists to some degree, a
correlation between displacement and natural disasters
(r=0.220), did not yield a significant result at the 90 percent confidence level. Therefore, this study cannot rule
out the possibility there might not be a correlation at all.
In other words, all variables are positively correlated.
However, as we crossed the different variables, the levels of correlation became stronger.
Furthermore, the significance tests applied, and which
measure the confidence levels, rejected the null hypothesis
of this research. In this sense, this study is an invitation
to create more accessible data on human mobility associated with environmental factors that are sufficient and of
quality. Thus, the region could make visible and provide a
better understanding and attention to migration triggers,
allowing and thereby substantiating policies, actions, and
decisions at the regional and national level.
Putting these results into perspective and contextualizing them, as Figure 2 shows, the correlations intensify as
more variables are factored into the model. This report
argues that this is the case since emigration is a process
that occurs progressively after an initial shock (in this
case, natural disasters). The study accounts for countries
that have suffered years of deterioration and have not improved their resilience mechanisms to defend themselves
against these shocks. Thus, there are increases in internally displaced populations and migrants who look for
opportunities in Northern countries.

Figure 2: Intensity of correlation between natural disasters and migration
toward the North
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After assessing the results, the report suggests different
reasons explaining the results. First, looking at the
results from a vulnerability perspective, when a natural
disaster strikes a country, the level of vulnerability
that individuals face has a certain impact. However, as
displacement begins to occur because of these disasters,
their vulnerability levels increase, reflecting why
correlations get stronger.

Figure 3. Country of Hazard Type.
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Data related to violence, conflict, and economic factors prevail as primary triggers of human mobility in
the region. Other more easily identifiable factors often
hide the environmental trigger, either by the absence of
studies and the production of specific data, practical and
methodological difficulties to generate this type of data,
or the limited perception of the environmental factor as
a mobility inducer. It is necessary to reinforce the relationship between multiple vectors of mobility in the region and, especially, how environmental factors are the
trigger and are related to economic vulnerability, insecurity, conflict, and violence.
Generating evidence and data about the phenomenon
requires two aspects: (i) developing, testing, and validating specific methodologies, and (ii) reinforcing, improving, and coordinating methodologies and existing
data sources. The absence of characterization and precise definition of the phenomenon and its categories and
a defined and coherent methodology with the region’s
specificities are the main barriers.
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It is necessary to invest in data production systems with
integrated indicators on the environment and human
mobility. This can generate a set of regional indicators
of human mobility induced by climate change and disasters, which requires an integrated analysis and coordination between different databases and data sources
and the development of specific methodologies.
This study, therefore, indicates the need to expand the
availability of specific data, identify and fill gaps in data
on the phenomenon, produce new data where it does
not exist, and develop methodologies, standards, and
common protocols for harvesting, analysis, and data
collection. In addition, creating collaborative platforms for the dissemination and exchange of data to
improve its accessibility and applicability is highly recommended.
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Diego Chaves-González is a migration expert at the
World Bank Group and Senior Manager for the Latin
American Initiative at the Migration Policy Institute.

Page 20

BEYOND THE GREAT POWERS: CHALLENGES FOR UNDERSTANDING CYBER
OPERATIONS IN LATIN AMERICA
Louise Marie Hurel

T

he past decades have been marked by a renewed
interest from states in enhancing their cyber capabilities. Responses to evolving threats have ranged
from establishing designated bodies for cybersecurity
at the national level, such as cyber commands, to sanctions and cyber diplomacy as part of the ever-expanding national cyber policy ‘toolbox’. Countries such as
the United States, the United Kingdom, and their allies have increasingly focused on questions related to
offense-defense balance as part of designing their deterrence strategies in cyberspace. Concerns around
the asymmetrical nature of cyber threats and the lower barriers of entry for non-state actors (although, at
times, state-sponsored) have equally contributed to the
emergence of concepts such as “active cyber defense,”
“defend forward,” and “persistent engagement” as synonyms to “authorized offensive cyber operations.”1 In
so doing, states believe they can shift the incentives and
heighten the costs for adversaries (e.g., China, Russia,
and North Korea) to engage in malicious activity2 while
also staging a show of force.
While important, discussions around cyber operations
and threats have largely concentrated in a handful of
countries3 – aided by structural factors that include
but are not restricted to: the concentration of media
coverage in specific countries,4 stakeholder biases in
threat reporting5, the reproduction of donor-recipient/north-south logic through cyber capacity-building
programs, among other elements.6 In addition to these
factors, discourses that seek to reinforce a “great power
rivalry”7 – so often mobilized for capturing competition
among “cyber powers”– add to the list of dynamics that
obfuscate the scope of the study of global cybersecurity
politics, in general, and Latin America, in particular.
Cybersecurity is contextual. Threat perceptions, discourses and policies do not exist in a vacuum but co-exist in different cultural, political, social and economic
contexts. While it might seem slightly trivial to remark
such a point, the great power rivalry discourse and the
over-emphasis on a small group of “power-full” countries hinders the understanding of cyber politics as
something that can unfold in other spaces/places.
The focus of this paper is not one of tracing the
above-mentioned challenges per se (as that would require multiple papers) but one of recentering Latin
America as part of the cybersecurity construct while recognizing global constraints to the interpretation and understanding of how countries beyond the great powers
conceive of cyber operations.
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This paper addresses a much less visible, but perhaps
more concerning outcome of designing great/middle
power borders: It can often overlook significant reinterpretations of what cyber operations mean domestically
as one shifts to different threat landscapes and across
varying levels of capacities (and government bodies) to
identify, assess, attribute, and respond to attacks.
To address how cyber operations and cyber norms are
conceptualized in Latin America, this paper is divided
into three parts. The first part looks at how countries
across the region have sought to devise specific mechanisms to tackle cybersecurity issues regionally and how
some have started to craft more concrete interpretations of cyber operations under international law. The
second focuses on how cyber operations are increasingly positioned in a complex association between public
security forces and intelligence activities. Finally, the
paper concludes with remarks about the consequences
and challenges the relationship between public security and cybersecurity poses to countries in the region. In
so doing, I hope the paper can challenge the borders of
what is conceived as cyber politics, who can shape cybersecurity and shed light on the existing inequalities
that permeate the literature and discussions around
cyber operations. However, I do not assume aprioristically that there is a clearly defined uniqueness to Latin
American countries’ approaches to cyber operations
and international cyber norms. Rather, I seek to refocus the discussion on both the former and the latter in
the exercise of departing from the complex reality of
cybersecurity in the region.
Who’s great? Great Power blindfold?
The release of President Biden’s Interim National Security Strategic Guidance in March 2021 and other reports and interviews with White House spokespersons
indicated a new shift in vocabulary from “great power
competition” to “strategic competition” for dealing with
China and other actors.8 In practice, the proposal for a
new “strategic” narrative from the Biden administration
may be discursively less explicit about rivalry, but it is
still primarily concentrates in framing the United States
engagement with China and Russia while collaborating
with P5 and allies. As previously mentioned, while the
great powers are not the focus of this paper, I highlight
three dynamics that set the scene of contentions for the
study of concepts such as cyber operations beyond the
“great powers” and thus paving the way for situating
Latin American countries in this landscape.
First, the great power construct often incurs in an
over-simplification of state-state relations in which
private companies have considerable power over the
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governance of networked infrastructures and the production of knowledge about threats.9 The ransomware attacks promoted by the Russian group Darkside
against the state-owned Brazilian energy supplier Copel10 and, most notoriously, Colonial Pipeline,11 provide
examples of the pervasive private oversight over critical infrastructure.
Second, it restricts the scope of which countries’ agendas
matter in the making and shaping of cybersecurity—and
which terms and institutional models are more desirable for conducting cyber operations.12 With the United
States, United Kingdom, European Union, China, and
Russia as key players, one can often miss the specificities
of how cyber operations and cyber norms are conceptualized and approached in other institutional contexts,
more specifically, in Latin America.
Third, it positions countries beyond the great powers
as either key adversaries or as “others,” “secondary
states,” “developing states,” “swing states,”13 or “middle powers.”14 In this regard, such narratives can contribute to the fixing of a central position against which
other countries are measured.15 Such measurement can
be identified more explicitly through the development of
metrics to assess a country’s maturity or cyber power,16
and subjectively through discourses that seek to contrast
authoritarian and democratic approaches.
In light of these challenges, the following section unpacks the role of regional bodies in attempting to build
a common vision for tackling cybersecurity threats and
Latin American countries’ evolving position in the applicability of international law in cyberspace.

From regional developments to countries
views on international cyber norms
For nearly two decades, the Organization of American
States (OAS) has been a key player in promoting cybersecurity capacities in the region through technical
trainings and dialogues and has become an important locus for member states to discuss cybersecurity-related issues at the regional level. In 2003, only
two months after the adoption of the United Nations
(UN) General Assembly resolution on the “Creation of
a global culture of cybersecurity,” the OAS published
the “Declaración sobre Seguridad de las Américas,” in
which states recognize the need to adapt to a shifting
threat landscape by establishing a multidimensional
vision for hemispheric security. The declaration made
explicit member states’ commitment to identifying
and combating “emerging threats” such as cybersecurity, biological terrorism, and threats to critical
infrastructure.17 The document also noted that states
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would develop a cybersecurity culture in the Americas
by adopting measures for “preventing, treating, and
responding to cyberattacks … combating cyber threats
and cybercrime, typifying attacks against cyberspace,
protecting critical infrastructure and protecting networked systems.”18
While the 2003 Declaration was a critical step in setting a regional security vision that went beyond traditional threats and recognized the state was not the sole
actor in providing security, the 2004 “Inter-American
Strategy to combat threats to cybersecurity” further
consolidated cybercrime and cybersecurity as an integral part of the hemispheric agenda. Since then, the
agenda19 has been operationalized through the work of
the Inter-American Telecommunication Commission,
the OAS Inter-American Committee Against Terrorism
(OAS-CICTE), and the Meetings of Ministers of Justices, other Ministers, Prosecutors and Attorneys General of the Americas.20
In 2017 the OAS established, within CICTE, the Working Group on Co-operation and Confidence-Building
Measures in Cyberspace (CBM). Member states have
incrementally added new CBMs to the list. 21 These
include, but are not restricted to, nominating points
of contact at the policy level capable of discussing
the implications of hemispheric cyber threats 22 and
strengthening cyber capacity building through activities such as seminars, conferences, and workshops
for both public and private sector officials in cyber
diplomacy.
Despite the continuous regional efforts to deepen
member state cooperation in cybersecurity and enhance cyber capacity building, when it comes to cyber operations, Latin American countries are still
developing their own understanding of the topic.
The fifth report of the Inter-American Judicial Committee (IACJ) on International Law and State Cyber
Operations provides some insights into the present
positions and gaps in defining cyber operations. The
objective of the report was to improve “transparency with respect to how member states understand
the application of international law to State cyber
operations.”23 According to Duncan Hollis, the group
rapporteur, states’ legal capacities are uneven in this
area. As he notes, “Some States evinced deep knowledge of cyber operations and the novel international legal issues they raise while others demonstrated
much less familiarity with the underlying international legal rules and the particular questions their applications generate in the cyber context.”24 In addition,
out of 35 OAS member states, only seven responded to
the IACJ questionnaire.25
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However, other forums, such as the UN Group of Governmental Experts (UNGGE) and the Open-Ended
Working Group (OEWG)—all of which are part of the
UN First Committee—pushed many member states to
publish their views on the applicability of international
law in cyberspace and their interpretation of what could
be some of the “redlines” in the context of a cyberattack.
As the table below shows, while many countries have
not published an official document or developed views
on state cyber operations and international law, they
have provided some indications in OEWG speeches and
interventions. The table presents excerpts from publicly
available documents submitted by delegations in the occasion of the UNOEWG and the UNGGE.

Table: Latin American countries that published their views on cyber operations
(emphasis added by the author)
Country

Source

Declaration (extracted from documents/speeches)

Brazil

Comment on Initial PreEmphasis on electoral interference
Draft of the OEWG Report “Brazil attaches fundamental importance to the need for adequate
(2020)
protection against threats to critical infrastructure, especially
electrical, water and sanitation systems (paragraph 19). Electoral
processes are also vulnerable to illegitimate interference through
the malicious use of ICTs [Information and Communications
Technology], and they should also be considered an essential
component of the critical infrastructure of states.”
Comment on Zero Draft of “Brazil has a few specific text suggestions, especially in the section
the OEWG Report (2021)
of international law, in which conceptual rigor is of utmost relevance. We will present our comments on each section as the debate
evolves. We will also be glad to share with the chair`s team our
specific comments to the text in written form.”
UNGGE Official
Compendium (2021)

Principle of sovereignty

“Interceptions of telecommunications, for instance, whether
or not they are considered to have crossed the threshold of
an intervention in the internal affairs of another State, would
nevertheless be considered an internationally wrongful act
because they violate state sovereignty. Similarly, cyber operations
against information systems located in another State’s territory or
causing extraterritorial effects might also constitute a breach of
sovereignty.”

Use of force

The United Nations Charter does not refer to specific weapons or
other means of use of force, and therefore the legal prohibition
applies to all of them. Cyber operations may amount to an illegal
use of force if they are attributable to a State and if their impact is
similar to the impact of a kinetic attack.
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Brazil

UNGGE Official
Compendium (2021)

Use of force—Recommendation on classification of
cyberattacks to aid in interpretation of use of force
and aggression.
“Although it is not binding, GA Res 3314(XXIX) has been
considered highly authoritative and has guided the ICJ in its
caselaw.3314 (XXIX) and cyber operations, due to their unique
characteristics. Therefore, it is advisable to update the multilateral
understanding of which acts amount to the use of force and
aggression, so as to include instances of cyberattacks. In many
instances, it might prove difficult to establish a direct analogy
between the acts listed in GA Res.”

State Responsibility - Attribution

[C]yber operations are attributable to a State if they are conducted
by a state organ, by persons or entities exercising elements of
governmental authority, or by persons or groups “acting on the
instructions of, or under the direction or control of,” the State.
Regarding the latter criteria, for a private person or entity’s conduct
to be attributable to a State, it has to be proved that the state had
“effective control” over the operations. It is clear, therefore, that
a connection “must exist between the conduct of a [state] and its
international responsibility.”
Chile

Comment on Initial
Pre-Draft of the OEWG
Report (2020)

Applicability of international law (IL), peaceful
settlement of disputes, non-intervention.

“De la misma forma destacamos y apoyamos las menciones hechas
respecto a que el derecho internacional y en particular a la Carta de
las Naciones Unidas, es aplicable y esencial para mantener la paz y la
estabilidad y promover un entorno de TICs abierto, seguro, estable,
accesible y pacífico. También valoramos la mención a principios
específicos de la Carta de las Naciones Unidas, en particular la
solución pacifica de controversias, la prohibición de recurrir a
la amenaza o al uso de la fuerza contra la integridad territorial o
independencia política de cualquier Estado, la no-intervención en
los asuntos internos de otros Estados, y el respeto por los derechos
humanos y las libertades fundamentales.”

Self-defense

“Por ejemplo, Chile considera legítimo la aplicación del principio de
la auto-defensa en virtud del Articulo 51 de la Carta de las Naciones
Unidas, si bien entiende que otros Estados discrepan.”
Comment on Zero Draft of --- (no mention of International Law or cyber operations) --the OEWG Report (2021)
Colombia

Comment on Initial
Pre-Draft of the OEWG
Report (2020)
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Applicability of International Law

“Colombia considers that general provisions and principles of
international law could also apply to cyberspace and, at the
moment, does not foresee the need to initiate negotiations for a
new legally binding instrument on the subject.”
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Colombia

Comment on Initial
Pre-Draft of the OEWG
Report (2020)

Attribution

“[D]iscussions regarding attribution of cyber-attacks at the UN level
are welcome, in order to increase accountability for malicious cyber
activities, and to determine the international responsibility of the
States for their internationally wrongful acts in the use of ICTs.”

Self-Defense

“The inherent right of individual or collective self-defense as
recognized in the Charter of the United Nations is essential to
maintaining peace and stability in the ICT environment, as it was
confirmed by the 2015 GGE report.”

Sovereignty

“State Sovereignty must not be used as a pretext to violate human
rights and freedoms or tighten control over citizens. It is essential
to maintain an open, secure, stable, accessible, and peaceful ICTs
environment.”

Regional collaboration

“Colombia supports the recommendation on enhancing the coordination with regional organizations, in order to exchange experiences at the UN level, on the development and operationalization of the confidence building measures and capacity building
efforts.”
Comment on Zero Draft of Applicability of International Law
the OEWG Report (2021)
“We highlight the importance of having the reference to the
applicability of the existing international law in cyberspace,
specifically of the United Nations Charter, as well as of leaving the
door open for future dialogues related to its interpretation and
application forms. The reference to the neutral and objective efforts
for building capacities in this regard is fundamental.“

Targets

“[M]y delegation celebrates the reference to the importance of the
protection of critical infrastructure, which should include medical
and healthcare facilities.”
Mexico

Comment on Initial
Pre-Draft of the OEWG
Report (2020)

“The list of existing and emerging threats should also include the
issues of hate speech and intrusive software, which were widely
highlighted by Member States and stakeholders alike.”

Uruguay

Comment on Initial
Pre-Draft of the OEWG
Report (2020)

Sovereignty

“[T]he sovereignty of each State in the decisions to be taken and
implemented in the future, as well as the guiding principles of the
international law, must be respected without exception.”

Human Rights

“The application of Human Rights norms in Cyberspace and for the
use of information and communication technologies, especially the
right to freedom of expression and online privacy, constitutes the
pillars that the States must not ignore, but rather must guarantee
and promote.”
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Uruguay

Comment on Initial
Pre-Draft of the OEWG
Report (2020)

Non-intervention / neutrality

Venezuela

Comment on Initial
Pre-Draft of the OEWG
Report (2020)

Applicability of International Law

“Uruguay does not carry out or support activities that may damage
the informational systems of the incident response centers in other
States. It also does not carry out activities that seek to attack other
centers from the CertUy.”
“Venezuela reiterates that the use of ICTs must be fully consistent with
the purposes and principles of the UN Charter and international law,
in particular the principles of sovereign equality, peaceful settlement
of international disputes, refraining in international relations from
the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political
independence of any State, and non-intervention in the internal
affairs of other States.”
[O]ur delegation recommends to avoid the mention made in
paragraph three to the military use of cyberspace, and to abstain from
making references to the application of international humanitarian
law in this context, as said branch of international law is exclusive to
armed conflict, as reflected in paragraphs 24 and 25.
Inclusion of shared response and interpretations of violations
Venezuela considers that this document should include a reference
to the role of digital platforms, companies and States in assuring
a responsible behavior that could prevent actions and/or attacks
against the territories and critical infrastructure of other States, with a
view to avoid the misuse of ICT’s for hostile propaganda; interference
in the internal affairs of States; violating the national sovereignty,
security, public order and health systems of States; discriminatory
treatment of information contents and/or disinformation; misuse
for criminal and terrorist purposes.

Beyond malicious use of ICT

“The document should also contemplate a reference to the monopoly
in internet governance, anonymity of persons, and aggressive cyber
strategies which clearly affect the capacities of States.”
“Venezuela would like to see reflected a clear condemnation of
the militarization of cyberspace and the covert and illegal use of
computer systems to attack other States, as well as the proliferation
of cybercrime and cyberterrorism, and an acknowledgement that
further efforts are needed to promote an open, secure, stable and
peaceful cyberspace from which all States can benefit, as well as
effective and urgent measures, within the framework of international
cooperation, to counter, by peaceful means, existing threats.”
Comment on Zero Draft of “Matters such as those relating to the automatic application of the UN
the OEWG Report (2021)
Charter and the international responsibility of States for illegal acts
in relation to the field of information and telecommunications in the
context of international security lack consensus and could therefore
be addressed in the text in a manner that effectively responds to the
particularities and sensibilities of all Member States.”
(Source: GGE26/OEWG)
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As the table above shows, six countries from the region
have published their statements on responsible state behavior in cyberspace in either the UNGGE or UNOEWG.
In September 2021, Brazil was the only country in Latin
America to have published an official document on these
matters. While not all papers/speeches explicitly mention
cyber operations, they provide some initial indicators regarding what could be considered a threat or risk to national cyber stability, including interference in electoral
infrastructure (Brazil), attacks on human rights (Uruguay
and Colombia), and the absence of a vision for a shared
responsibility of malicious ICT acts (Venezuela).
Brazil’s position paper provides more in-depth considerations of what would be understood as a cyber operation
under the principle of the use of force. Brazil notes that
“cyber operations may amount to an illegal use of force if
they are attributable to a State and if their impact is similar to the impact of a kinetic attack.”27 Thus, the identification of a cyber operation is directly related to at least
two criteria: first, a malicious attack that could fall under
International Law includes those perpetrated by a state
or a non-state actor. For a non-state actor to be associated with a state, “it has to be proved that the State had
“effective control” over the operations.”28 In other words,
the group or individuals involved should have been acting
under the instructions or control of the state. However,
many questions remain as to what kind of evidence would
configure enough effective control to attribute state-sponsored hacking to a group. Second, Brazil highlights that
a cyber operation is measured and understood not only
in relation to the actor (attribution) but the intensity of
its impact (“similar to the impact of a kinetic attack”),
a position that has been shared by other states. Despite
the country’s public position, it is still unclear what circumstances would potentially trigger political attribution
from Brazil and whether the government would consider
– as others have done29 – a more detailed distinction between ‘scale’ and ‘effects’ of the attack.
Countries in Latin America have been gradually developing their views on state cyber operations. However, the
discussions around the applicability of international law
in cyberspace represent only one dimension of a more
complex landscape of defining cyber operations. In the
case of international law, cyber operations are measured
in relation to how and when they might trigger international law (attacks), what can be learned from customary
international law, and how specific principles and protections under IL can support greater stability in the international system, and among other considerations. But what
happens to all the activities below the threshold? How
are they approached by countries in Latin America, and
which bodies are responsible for responding?
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The blurry (and dangerous) lines: cybersecurity and cybercrime in Latin America
For decades, cybercrime has been one of the main challenges facing countries in the region.30 From the theft of
financial data to cyber drug cartels, the threat landscape
in Latin America combines the emergence of increasingly complex cyberattacks directed toward government bodies with the consolidation of organized crime
online.31 Financially motivated threats and ransomware
attacks have become more sophisticated. If groups such
as Anonymous were using distributed denial-of-service
attacks in 2012 to take down websites from banking institutions in Brazil, the landscape in 2021 is much more
complex.
In 2020, the North Korean group “BeagleBoyz” conducted a global campaign using remote access malware
to steal data from financial institutions. Targeted countries in Latin America included Brazil, Chile, Costa Rica,
Mexico, Panama, Peru, Uruguay, and Ecuador.32 However, the attribution of BeagleBoyz as a state-sponsored
group gained notoriety after the U.S. government issued
a joint alert33 on the group, associating it with Advanced
Personal Threat 38:
The BeagleBoyz overlap to varying degrees with
groups tracked by the cybersecurity industry as
Lazarus, Advanced Persistent Threat 38 (APT38),
Bluenoroff, and Stardust Chollima and are responsible for the FASTCash ATM cash outs reported in
October 2018, fraudulent abuse of compromised
bank-operated SWIFT system endpoints since at
least 2015, and lucrative cryptocurrency thefts.
This illicit behavior has been identified by the United Nations (UN) DPRK Panel of Experts as evasion
of UN Security Council resolutions, as it generates
substantial revenue for North Korea. North Korea
can use these funds for its UN-prohibited nuclear
weapons and ballistic missile programs. Additionally, this activity poses significant operational risk
to the Financial Services sector and erodes the integrity of the financial system.
Even though multiple Latin American countries were
targeted, attribution was reportedly done by different
bodies of the U.S. government—with incident responders in the region replicating the notification issued by
the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency
(CISA).34 Most countries in the region engage in attribution through public security bodies, such as the police,
rather than political attribution of cyberattacks. Even so,
it is important to note that although the latter can often
be sparse, it does not mean it is non-existent. This was
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the case in the aftermath of the Edward Snowden documents, when it was revealed that the United States had
spied on President Dilma Rousseff and other important
political leaders and Brazil openly called out the US for
its cyber espionage.35 Venezuela, on the other hand, has
included cyber attribution as a growing part of their political strategy. Examples include the attribution of a
major power outage in 2019 and an attack against the
Bank of Venezuela – that left it offline for five days in
2021 – to the United States.36
Yet, even in the case of other notorious incidents, Latin American countries have often responded with a
criminal approach37 as the primary avenue for attribution and response. Governments across the region
have been investing heavily in new programs for police
forces and equipping them with tools for conducting
forensic activities. Mexico, for example, launched a
24/7 network for cybercrime in 2017 and established a
model for cybercrime police forces.38 Other countries,
like Brazil, also have a national network of cybercrime
police stations.39 The police have been working with
other public security bodies, such as the Office of Integrated Operations (SEOPI) of the Ministry of Justice
and Public Security on operational intelligence to investigate and respond to cyberattacks.40 Even so, the
development of institutional mechanisms dedicated to
cybercrime has been followed by an increased acquisition of investigatory software and tools—often with
little transparency regarding the purpose and continuity of the use of a specific tool. In the case of Brazil, a
public call from the SEOPI for open-source software in
May 2021 became a national conundrum when the bid
received a proposal from the Israeli technology firm,
NSO Group Technologies.
In early July 2021, multiple organizations such as Amnesty International, The Guardian, Forbidden Stories,
and other media organizations came together to release the results of a months-long investigation into the
use of the NSO Group Technologies’ spyware solution,
Pegasus.41 Countries in Latin America, such as Mexico,
had reportedly been using the spyware technology for
more than a decade at the cost of over US$160 million
to target groups.42
This emphasis on cybercrime has potential implications
for understanding cyber operations as an integral part
of criminal prosecution, technical attribution, and digital forensics activities. While the incipient discussion (or
lack of one) on cyber operations at the regional level is
partly tied to a lack of capacities or a mismatch of focal points at the national and regional levels, it can also
serve as a smoke screen for Latin American countries to
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continue developing their cyber capabilities with little to
no oversight. The blurriness between police forces and
other public security bodies can (and has) posed challenges to accountability over software acquisitions. This
is particularly worrying as it raises important questions
over states’ purchasing power of cyber weapons with a
risk of little public oversight.

Conclusion
This paper sought to address how cyber operations
and cyber norms are conceptualized in Latin America.
To do so, regional and national developments in this
field were reviewed, along with the involvement of
countries in Latin America in international processes
(UNGGE/OEWG).
The OAS continues to play an essential role in building
cyber capacities in the region. However, as the IACJ
report indicates, member states’ views are still a patchwork of understandings about responsible state behavior in cyberspace and the role of cyber operations. One
IACJ state representative called for “developing a distinctly Latin American perspective on the international
governance and legal framework of cyberspace”43 that
would—instead of duplicating efforts—build on previous experiences (UNGGE and OEWG) to “develop a Latin American framework for understanding international
law in cyberspace based on a shared political culture of
democratic institutions and Ibero-American history.”
Comments such as this indicate some resistance to the
great power rivalry and propose a complementary but
Latin American interpretation of IL. 44
However, as the paper highlighted, while Latin American countries face challenges in defining state cyber operations from an international law perspective. A more
practice-oriented view of cyber operations indicates
that some of their activities concentrate on the realm of
cybercrime. Cyber operations, in its broader and practice-based sense, rely on concentrating capabilities in
police forces and other public security bodies associated
with law enforcement. This complex scenario points to
a worrying landscape in which police forces and public
security bodies can overextend their scope of activities
through the acquisition of surveillance tools and other
malicious solutions.
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T

ransnational organized crime (TOC) is a significant
and growing threat to the security of the United States
and a major security challenge in other critical regions of
the world. TOC continues to expand dramatically in size,
scope, and influence with major destabilizing effects. In
recent years, TOC entities have embraced new, and often
violent, practices and advanced strategies to circumvent
the traditional norms of legal economies and evade security interventions often operating through a vast economic system of dark networks and economies—illicit
and illegal sourcing, labor inputs, production, products
and services, supply chains, and consumer operations.1
Within these clandestine systems, TOC entities are expanding their operations, diversifying their activities, as
well as exploiting the increased blurring between illicit
and licit activities. The rapid evolution of TOC entities
in the past 15 years has engendered a more convoluted,
violent, and destabilizing convergence of threat vectors
challenging security regimes in detecting, disrupting,
and dismantling the (il)licit and (il)legal of transnational
criminal enterprises.

The shadow economy consists of two different economies: The illicit economy and the illegal economy. The
illicit economy is akin to the informal economy, that is,
activities that are largely legal—selling food and other goods. These activities become illicit when they are
done “extra-institutionally;” meaning the proceeds are
not taxed and are not “recorded” by the government,
or the proper permits and other bureaucratic operating requirements are not met. None of these activities
are captured in national GDP estimates.4 Conversely,
the illegal economy consists of productive activities
that run counter to domestic and/or international law.
Some illegal productive activities (e.g., production of
narcotics and drugs) are profitable enough to indirectly impact GDP, while others typically do not.

The typical consumer only ever experiences the point
of sale for the illicit/illegal good. They do not see the
hierarchical structures and transnational trade that
undergirds their purchase. The shadow economy, as
Medina and Schneider notes, goes by many names and,
depending on how it is defined, represents a significant
share of global GDP. For example, among 158 states
the average size of a state’s shadow economy relative
to their GDP was 31.9% between 1991 and 20152. By
some estimates revenues generated by transnational
crime are estimated to be worth as much as $2.2 trillion annually3. This, of course, does not account for
the countless other goods and services illicitly and/or
illegally produced and purchased around the world not
captured in estimates.

TOC entities thrive in the shadow economy because
they are institutionally adept at navigating between
the (il)licit and the (il)legal. In a recent radio interview, sociologist Federico Varese who primarily focuses on Mafia hierarchy, suggested that TOC entities
are three conjoined entities: 1) producers of goods
and services; 2) traffickers of the goods; and 3) overall TOC governance actors.5 TOC governance exists to
unify existing shadow economy structures in a similar
fashion as a corporation would vertically integrate its
supply chain. More specifically, TOC entities in Latin
America have become polycrime entities,6 embracing
multiple types and forms of criminality. Increasingly,
TOC entities are structured in such a way to encourage
polycrime activity. This is particularly relevant to narcotraffickers, but is also applicable to other criminal
entities for whom narcotics production, trafficking,
and/or distribution are not their primary type of activity.7 These entities now have decades of experience
in illicit and illegal practices that benefit multiple different types of transnational criminal activity. With
transnational networks in place, weapons trafficking, human trafficking and/or smuggling, intellectual
property crime, counterfeit products, and counterfeit
drugs all become viable productive activities.8

In this piece, we will demonstrate the general hierarchical structure of TOC entities that promulgate a significant proportion of the shadow economy and, in turn,
how the existing legitimate economic structures make
TOC entity activities profitable and difficult to curtail. At
their core, TOCs are driven by market forces and opportunity, and they seek to maximize and sustain profits,
similar to licit businesses. Yet while TOC entities operate like other legitimate businesses, albeit with (il)legal/
(il)licit goods and services, they actively work to circumvent, evade, and ignore economic norms exercising corrupt, exploitative, and violent means to perpetuate their
profit maximization.

We suggest that there is a fourth role within TOC entities: the “violence worker.” Violence workers are those
members of TOC entities that use violence to enforce
(bureaucratic) order. Violence workers appear organically, and become specialized, in the ranks of producers, traffickers, and governors, and work to reinforce
TOC goals through the use of violence. The “order-enforcement” exercised by violence workers functions as
a determined logic of coercion and violence aimed to
define the extent of TOC governance.9 Significantly,
order-enforcement requires a substantial balancing
act so that the fear constituted by TOC vio lence workers creates economic opportunities without fully dele-
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gitimizing their standing, especially those that blend
illicit and licit activities, or draws significant attention
from state interventionary forces.10 In other words, violence workers employ order-enforcement to normalize TOC entities’ claims of legitimacy to govern and
operate across their territories. As TOC entities grow
and diversify, violence workers have become more indispensable.
For some organized criminal entities, violence workers mainly serve a productive role, meaning that they
manage “strong arm” activities like extortion, protection rackets, burglaries, and robberies. In more
sophisticated polycrime transnational organized
criminal entities, violence workers commit similar
activities, and involve violence specialization, like
firefights (tiroteos), assassinations (asesinatos), and
raids (incursiónes) at varying levels of intensity and
tactical action, to ensure successful trafficking operations.11 The economic gains from rudimentary violence work are rather insignificant compared with the
funds received from successful trafficking operations.
Moreover, varying levels and intensity of violence
maintained by violence workers across all scales of
TOC activity engenders a “criminal governance” that
functions in opposition to and often in collusion with
the state’s capacity to govern, occupying an occluded
space between everyday criminal (bureaucratic) activity and violent conflict.12
Borrowing from Mancur Olson’s work, violence workers who support TOC entities are disinclined from
participating in what Olson termed “roving banditry”
because as “stationary bandits,” they are economically successful and not raising the ire of state entities
that could counter their efforts. However, when states
flex their muscles and challenge TOC sovereignty,
it incentivizes violence workers to organize against
state forces and civilian populations to maintain the
entity’s existing business practices. Even though violence workers are indispensable to TOC entities in
stimulating and maintaining illicit practices, (semi-)
legitimate economic structures and individuals, socalled “facilitators”, make TOC activities even more
profitable by crossing the between the shadow economy and global economy to serve legitimate customers
and TOC entities alike.13 Facilitators serve wittingly,
and sometimes unwittingly, to connect TOC entities
to legitimate economic structures, like offshore bank
accounts and shell corporations, in order to sustain
growing polycrime infrastructures. Violence workers
and facilitators both function to advance perpetuation
of TOC activities and their profitability underpinning
the foundations of the shadow economy.
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Recent TOC Trends
In the past, TOC entities largely remained regional in
their operational scope with strict hierarchical structures. Today, TOC entities are more variable and volatile embracing new, and often violent, operational strategies increasing not only their diversification of illicit
activities, but also, the density of those illicit activities.
Additionally, TOC entities increasingly engage in illicit
activities that transgress territories and borders of a single state. This expansion poses serious threats to neighboring states and their citizens, generating both direct
and indirect economic harm, affecting social structures,
like public health, and hindering the development and
stability of states.14 Notable trends in TOC that present
significant challenges today include:
1.

Fragmentation: TOC fragmentation has led to increasingly adaptable, agile, and competitively violent criminal organizations with varying structures
and wider networks.

2. Geographical expansion: TOC expansion has led to
greater contestation over illicit inputs, routes, and
markets globally.
3. Diversification: TOC entities are diversifying their
criminal portfolios, thus increasing their criminal
density, seeking greater profits, consolidation of
markets, and safeguarded supply chains.
4. Legitimate entanglement: TOC entities are becoming increasingly entangled with legitimate businesses and actors, including state actors (e.g., corrupt
security force personnel), and especially, banking
institutions to launder money.
5.

Specialization: TOC entities pursue cross-national
specialization, forging networked criminal connections at regional and global scales.

6. Virtual: There is an increasing role of cyber capabilities in TOC as TOC entities exploit online dark networks (i.e., the dark web) and licit online economic
platforms, to sell goods and services.
The most indelible issues we face when countering TOC
involve the metastasizing and merging of regional entities into global juggernauts. The initial Medellín and Cali
cartels were transnational because they produced their
goods in Colombia and Bolivia and they were transported to, and sold in, the United States. Yet we have seen
subsequent Mexican cartels— Sinaloa and Loz Zetas, for
example—expand their reach globally partnering with
European, Asian, Australian, and African organized
criminal entities to reshape the drug trade.15 This has
been evident most recently in the mixing of Mexican
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and European assets to produce highly refined crystal
meth that has taken over the European recreational
drug scene. In late 2020, police raids in The Netherlands
discovered a professional crystal meth lab that was truly global: Mexicans cooked the meth using Dutch-made
equipment and chemicals sourced from China. The recent raids have uncovered links to the Jalisco New Generation Cartel (CJNG), one of the newer and most violent Mexican cartels.16 CJNG and the Sinaloa cartel have
also been linked to the recent proliferation of fentanyl
that has fueled the opioid epidemic in the United States
over the last few years.17 Cartels send envoys to China
to purchase dual use precursor chemicals and/or bulk
shipments of fentanyl, and then ship those to Mexican
ports, like Lázaro Cardenas, where cartel members take
possession of the material for further processing, trafficking, and then vending.18 These methods, at the current economy of scale, make these operations incredibly
profitable. The profitability and global nature have led to
increases in violence brought about by difficulties managing the hierarchy across global space in addition to the
opportunity to earn profit at all levels.
Conclusion
These characteristics of TOC entities—the increasingly
global scope of their reach, the institutionalization of
violence, and the fine line between illicit and illegal—
have profound implications for the global economy.
The implications of the capacity and capabilities to
counter TOC profoundly shape if, when, and how these
current and emerging trends continue to produce violent and destabilizing consequences. The growth in
criminal density and geographical expansion of TOC
entities across various regions in the world, including
the U.S. Southern Border, will only continue to produce instability. As TOC entities form more sophisticated networks and means of transnational operation,
it is necessary to consider ways to enhance data collection, analysis, and information sharing capabilities
across states to keep pace with the rapidly changing dynamics of TOC activities, and to address gaps in policy
and practice to counter TOC.
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